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Introduction 
 
Non-neutrality of money and stickiness of prices puzzled the economist for decades. 
One of the reasons is that in short-term money seems to be salient and natural unit. 
The phenomenon of money illusion is one of the central aspects with this regard. The 
term money illusion coined by well-known economist Irving Fisher. Money illusion 
refers to the tendency to confuse nominal and real aspects of the economy. According 
to the concept, even though people are aware of existing difference between nominal 
and real values, it still could be a case that peoples’ thinking of transactions is 
dominated by nominal values.  
 
Behavioural economic theory classifies money illusion as a potentially important form 
of bounded rationality. Money illusion seems to be persistent and not removed by 
learning. The theory tries to account of money illusion on physiological basis, in order 
to better understand this phenomena and model its consequences. However, there is 
no any formal model that allows explaining this phenomenon. Nevertheless, 
developments in experimental economics shed some light on this issue.  
 
The series of experimental investigations put on the table contradictory evidences 
against standard theory. An experimental study by Shafir et al (1997) examined 
peoples’ attitudes towards changes in nominal magnitudes under different context and 
framing. They found that nominal values affect people’s perception of constraints and 
individual-level money illusion does exists (“indirect” effect). More importantly, 
people not only are prone to money illusion but they also expect other peoples to be 
prone to money illusion (“indirect” effect). 
 
The experimental study by Fehr and Tyran (2004) (henceforth FT (2004)) addresses 
to the phenomenon of money illusion. In particular, FT (2004) examined the role of 
money illusion and its impact as a coordination device in equilibrium selection 
problem within homogeneous subjects. They experiment found evidences against 
standard theory; under strategic setting when strategic complementarily prevails, 
“indirect” effect of money illusion has large and permanent effect.  
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We draw our inspiration from this study and propose to experimentally examine the 
effect of money illusion on equilibrium selection problem within heterogeneous 
subjects. Our experiment has two main aims. First, we want to experimentally 
investigate and draw comparison of the aggregate outcomes with the different levels 
of heterogeneity in terms of money illusion prone and money illusion free subjects.1 
Secondly, we want to find whether under strategic setting money illusion prone 
subject/s are able to learn by imitating the money illusion free subjects.  
 
Economic Theory and Relevance 
 
Economic theory is considered to be a real theory and economists are mainly 
concerned to what is happening with real economy. However, almost all transactions 
in economy are carried out in money and thus, economy is nominal as well. Finally, 
Economic theory has little to say how equilibrium is reached. As it is often the case, 
for equilibrium to prevail, assumption of rationality is not sufficient; one has also to 
assume a common knowledge of rationality, which is highly unlikely to be met in 
practice. 
 
The Keynesian theory considered the money illusion as an important phenomenon and 
introduced short-term money non-neutrality in order to account to, and argued that 
pure monetary changes could have real effects on economy. However, since “rational 
expectation revolution” in 1970s, money illusion explanation was ultimately 
dismissed and plays no role in nowadays standard economic theory. The reason is 
straightforward, since rationality and rational expectation was assumed, there was 
nothing to study; money illusion assumption was ignored on “a priori” grounds. 
 
The Experiment 
 
In order to investigate our subject of interest, we followed the study by FT (2004). 
Since, our experiment is largely based on FT (2004), we present their experimental 
design and protocol, and then introduce our modifications.   
                                                            
1 Perhaps it is more natural way to think about complex economic reality, in terms of interaction 
between heterogeneous agents, rather then homogeneous ones.    
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Design 
 
FT (2004) designed following experimental protocol. They introduced coordination 
game with three Pareto-ranked equilibria described in Table 1. Each player had to set 
simultaneously a price between 1 and 30 and the subjects were grouped in 5 subjects 
(or 6).  
 
 
Table 1 Three Pareto Equilibria Of The Game 
 
Equilibrium Equilibrium 
price 
Real equilibrium 
payoff 
Nominal 
equilibrium payoff 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The game was with strategic complementarities, thus, say, subject i’s real payoff 
depend only on his price
i
P and the average price of the rest of the players in his 
group ip− . Moreover, subject i was playing unique best replay for every level ip− . In 
general, as ip−  was increasing, the player i best response was to increase his price as 
well. The game was symmetric and the best replay function was located on 45 degree 
line in payoff matrix (see appendix A).   
 
The money illusion was captured as a behavioural pattern in relation to nominal 
payoff matrix and real payoff matrix (see appendix A). There was no objective 
difference in terms of real payoffs between these two payoff matrixes. Only difference 
was that the players with nominal payoff matrix had to divide the nominal payoff by 
ip− in order to find out real payoff.2  
 
 
 
                                                            
2 Further, the authors created conflict between nominal payoff equilibrium and real payoff equilibrium, 
whereas in real payoff matrix the equilibrium A was yielding clearly the highest payoff and in nominal 
payoff matrix the equilibrium C loomed as the equilibrium with highest payoff. Thus, in real payoff 
matrix equilibrium A had obvious real dominance, while in nominal payoff matrix equilibrium C had 
nominal dominance.  
4=PA
10=PB
27=PC
28=π A
5=π B
21=π C
π A 112=PA
π B 50=PB
π C 567=PC
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Standard Theory Predictions  
 
In fact the equilibrium A was the only Pareto efficient point in all payoff space, 
regardless whether it was represented in nominal payoff matrix or in real payoff 
matrix. Therefore, since subjects were faced objectively the same equilibrium 
selection problem where the equilibrium A was the only Pareto efficient point 
regardless whether the problem was represented in real or nominal terms, the standard 
theory predicts no difference between behaviour in real representation and in the 
nominal representation. In other words, the standard theory predicts that subject will 
permanently coordinate on the equilibrium A, despite the difference between nominal 
and real payoff representation.  
 
The Representation  
 
The session was run at the CeDEx laboratory at the School of Economics, University 
of Nottingham. The recruited subjects where mainly postgraduate students from the 
School of Economics. The session was computerised using z-tree software. Students 
were seated in a random order at PCs. Instructions were read aloud and questions 
were answered in private.3 Throughout the experiment students were not allowed to 
communicate and could not see others’ screens. Subjects were not told and did not 
expect whether there was any difference in any terms across and within groups.4 
Subjects were allowed to take notes and many of them did.5  
 
The Protocol  
 
To be able to compare the results of our experiment to the results of the FT (2004), we 
drew a protocol as close as possible to theirs. Thus, we maintain the game the same as 
FT (2004), using the same payoff matrixes. Analogously to FT(2004), subject had to 
decide to choose price between 1 and 30 and also indicate what they expected as the 
                                                            
3 Before the start of the experiment, subjects were given 5 minutes to read the instructions themselves. 
However, due to unexpected technical difficulties with the computer, subjects had additional 10 
minutes to before the experiment took place. Moreover, the technical difficulty forced us to exclude 
one group of five subjects and conduct 10 rounds instead of 15 planned rounds.     
4 During dealing the technical difficulty that we experienced we could not fully control fro the 
communication between subjects that we can not exclude. 
5 The salience in the experiment was met; the subjects were repaid according to their profits earned in 
the experiment by chewing gums. The exchange rate was 20 (experimental) points 1 chewing gum.  
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average price of the rest of her group. After each period, each subject, received 
feedback of her real payoff, and the average price of the rest of her group members.  
 
We only did slight modifications, which did not have any impact on the logic and 
structure of the game. We firstly took the same group size (5 subjects). Secondly, 
given the constraints, we had only 15 subjects. Thirdly, we took as baseline treatment 
group of 5 subjects with nominal payoff matrixes.6 Finally, we induced the 
heterogeneity by endowing real and nominal payoff matrixes accordingly the group 
composition in each treatment and created two different levels of heterogeneity in the 
group. Thus, in the group of 2R&3N, we experimentally induced two money illusion 
free subjects. Similarly, in the group of 4R&1N we increased the number of these 
subjects to the maximum. The two following treatments that are envisaged in the new 
experiment are Treatment 2 and Treatment 3:  
 
Treatment 1: The group of 5 subjects with nominal payoff matrix (5N) 
 
Treatment 2: The group of 2 subjects with real payoff matrix and remaining 3 subjects 
with nominal payoff matrix (2R&3N) 
 
Treatment 3: The group of 4 subjects with real payoff matrix and remaining 1 subject 
with nominal payoff matrix (4R&1N) 
 
Expectations 
 
FT (2004) found that that money illusion exists only temporarily and it disappears at 
the individual level when subjects can repeatedly make the same decision in the 
context of an individual optimization task. Further, the authors found that in first few 
periods individual-level of money illusion is dominant relative “indirect” effect of 
money illusion which dominates afterwards. With respect to the two group 
composition, we have two different strength of learning effect from money illusion 
free subjects. We expect that this learning effect would reduce or possibly outweigh 
                                                            
6 We choose the treatment with 5 subjects with nominal payoff matrix as baseline treatment, because 
was more relevant given the subject of interest the design had and it served as best measurement tool 
for remaining two treatments. Moreover, we expected the outcome of group of 5 subjects with real 
payoff matrix relatively straightforward.   
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the effect of individual-level money illusion. Therefore, we expect that the group 
4R&1N has relatively higher chance to coordinate to the Pareto-efficient equilibrium 
rather than the group 2R&3N.      
 
The Results 
  
In this section we present our results from different treatment conditions. Our main 
interest lies in comparison between 4R&1N and 2R&3N treatments, with particular 
focus on 4R&1N treatment.  Figure 1 depicts the coordination path to the equilibria of 
three different groups. The vast majority of subjects were playing the best replay to 
the average expectations of the other players. Thus the subject choices were 
determined by subjects’ average expectations (see Appendix C).   
 
Figure 1: Three Group Coordination 
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The average price of the group of 5N started around 15 and converged to the 
inefficient equilibrium C relatively fast. This result supports the FT (2004) results that 
nominal representation of payoff matrix caused the convergence to the inefficient 
equilibrium. However, two subjects in this group played price 1 and 2. This, finding 
indicates that these to players overcame the direct effect of money illusion. However, 
 8 
they did not expect others to do so and tried to influence the average price.7 
Nevertheless, all players in period 4 played equilibrium price 27.    
 
The group 2R&3N stared at average price 14 and converged slowly to the inefficient 
equilibrium. In the group only one real subject choose efficient equilibrium price 4, 
other three nominal subjects play on average price 15. Noteworthy, second real 
subject chose price of 21, which could be interpreted as a bounded rationality (see 
Appendix B).  
 
Interestingly, the group 4R&1N remained relatively stable around unstable 
equilibrium price 10. In this group, only one real subject chose price 4 and second real 
subject chose 5 (see Table 2 in Appendix B).8 The other two remaining real subjects 
choose price 15 and 13, which either could be interpreted as bounded rationality or in 
some sense as players’ strategy to choose “something in between”. More importantly, 
we observed that that the only nominal subject in this group that chose price 23 in first 
period, played price 7 in second period. Onwards, one part of the subjects was playing 
prices above 10 and the other part below. However in last to periods most of them 
played unstable equilibrium price.     
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the fact that we do not have sufficient observations and the experiment did 
not run as one would consider appropriate, our experimental results suggest that 
money illusion persist with heterogeneous agents under strategic setting. The results 
contradict standard theory assumptions. We found no support to the efficient market 
hypothesis that irrational agents will be driven out by rational ones. In general, as we 
increased the heterogeneity in terms of money illusion free subjects, the group 
efficiency was decreasing.9 Our evidences show that small bounded rationality also 
                                                            
7 It is worth to note that FT(2004) did not find any evidence in their treatment of 5 nominal subjects, 
that at least one to choose price 4 or below. This can be partly explained by the fact that due to our 
technical difficulties players had nearly 15 minutes to examine the payoff matrix.    
8 One real subject in first three periods was repeatedly choosing price 4, probably in order to signal the 
rest of the group members on the efficient equilibrium. However, he “gave up” in period 4.  
9 The group 5N – 58% of efficiency, group 2R&3N – 34% of efficiency and group 4R&1N – 14% of 
efficiency. We measure the efficacy in terms of total profits earned during the experiment relative to 
the maximum profit that group could achieve by playing efficient equilibrium. Moreover, it is 
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persists and affects group’s outcome. The data from treatment 3, suggests that even 
one money illusion prone agent can cause inefficient outcome. Interestingly, we find 
that under strategic setting money illusion prone subject learns from others behavior. 
However, the effect of learning under strategic setting seems to be a double-edged; 
while money illusion free subject learns fast by imitating others to how to overcome 
money illusion, at the same time her previous actions distorts the aggregate behavior. 
As it seems, this pattern is largely responsible for the observed stability around 
unstable equilibrium.  
 
The results from treatment 3 cast doubts, whether under this experimental setting the 
group would be able to converge either to one of the stable equilibria. Therefore, it 
would be interesting to investigate these findings further.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
interesting to note that in the group 2R&3N the highest total profit of nominal players was twice as 
much as the lowest total profit earned by real player.    
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APPENDIX A   
 
Real payoff matrix 
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Nominal payoff matrix 
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Instructions 
 
 
Welcome and thank you very much for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions 
carefully. You can earn chewing gums through this task. During the experiment, we calculate your 
payoff in points. All points you earn during the experiment will be converted into a number of chewing 
gums, according to the exchange rate: 20 points = 1 chewing gum. 
 
Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you need to ask 
questions, please stay silent and raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to answer your 
question. 
 
This experiment will be run for 15 periods. All participants are divided into groups of 5 people. You 
will not know who is in your group but the composition of the group remains stable throughout the 
experiment. Only the decisions in your group are relevant for your earnings. Decisions by other groups 
are irrelevant for you.  
 
All group members play the role of firms. In each period, all firms must simultaneously set a price from 
1 to 30 (1 and 30 included). How much you earn depends on the price you choose and on the average 
price that all other firms in your group choose.   
 
The income table distributed shows your nominal point income.  
Example: Suppose you choose a price of 15 and the other firms choose prices of 16 on average. In this 
case your nominal point income is 48 points. 
 
For the determination of your earnings at the end of the experiment, only the real point income is 
relevant. This holds for all firms. To calculate your real point income from your nominal point income, 
you have to divide the nominal point income by the average price of other firms. Thus, the nominal and 
the real point income are related as follows: 
 
Real point income = Nominal point income / Average price of other firms 
 
In the example above, your nominal point income is 48 points, but your real point income is 3 points (= 
48 points/ 16). 
 
The procedure of the experiment is the following: 
At the beginning of each period, you choose a selling price (that is, a number from 1 to 30) and indicate 
which average price of the other firms you expect. At the end of each period you are informed about 
the actual average price of the other firms and about your actual real point income. 
 
 
 
Instructions  
 
 
Welcome and thank you very much for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions 
carefully. You can earn chewing gums through this task. During the experiment, we calculate your 
payoff in points. All points you earn during the experiment will be converted into a number of chewing 
gums, according to the exchange rate: 20 points = 1 chewing gum. 
 
Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you need to ask 
questions, please stay silent and raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to answer your 
question.  
 
This experiment will be run for 15 periods. All participants are divided into groups of 5 people. You 
will not know who is in your group but the composition of the group remains the same throughout the 
experiment. Only the decisions in your group are relevant for your earnings. Decisions by other groups 
are irrelevant for you.  
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All group members play the role of firms. In each period, all firms must simultaneously set a price from 
1 to 30 (1 and 30 included). How much you earn depends on the price you choose and on the average 
price that all other firms in your group choose.   
 
The payoff matrix distributed shows your real point income.  
Example: Suppose you choose a price of 15 and the other firms choose prices of 16 on average. In this 
case your real point income is 3 points. 
 
The procedure of the experiment is the following: 
At the beginning of each period, you choose a selling price (that is, a number from 1 to 30) and indicate 
which average price of the other firms you expect. At the end of each period you are informed about 
the actual average price of the other firms and about your actual real point income. 
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Appendix B 
Table 2: Group of 4R&1N 
Period 1    
Player Price Expectation Average price of others 
Real 15 16 11 
Real 13 15 12 
Real 4 4 14 
Real 5 6 14 
Nominal 23 22 9 
Period 2    
Player Price Expectation Average price of others 
real 17 19 9 
real 10 11 11 
real 4 4 12 
real 15 14 10 
nominal 7 8 12 
Period 3    
Player Price Expectation Average price of others 
real 7 11 13 
real 10 11 12 
real 4 4 14 
real 20 19 10 
nominal 17 16 10 
Table 3: Group of 2R&3N 
Period 1   
Player Price Expectation Average price of others 
nominal 15 15 14 
nominal 15 15 14 
nominal 16 15 14 
real 21 20 13 
real 4 4 17 
Period 2   
Player Price Expectation Average price of others 
nominal 14 15 16 
nominal 15 14 16 
nominal 16 15 15 
real 14 18 16 
real 18 17 15 
Period 10   
Player Price Expectation Average price of others 
nominal 28 29 28 
nominal 27 27 28 
nominal 28 28 28 
real 29 28 28 
real 27 26 28 
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Appendix C  
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